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ARTICLE 
Is IT POSSmLE TO HAVE A SERIOUS 
DISCUSSION ABOUT RELIGIOUS 
COMMITMENT AND 
JUDICIAL RESPONSmILITIES? 
SANFORD LEVINSON* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the explanations for the convening of the conference at which 
this essay was first presented is that, for the first time in American history, a 
majority of the Supreme Court consists of Roman Catholics. By any mea-
sure, this is a significant development in an American polity that, for much 
of its history, was anti-Catholic-sometimes virulently so. As a symbolic 
moment, the shift toward a Catholic Court surely ranks with the earlier mo-
ment this decade when both the United States Secretary of State and Na-
tional Security Advisor were African-Americans. Whatever one's partisan 
political views, one can only rejoice at this tangible evidence of a far more 
pluralistic and non-discriminatory America than even the one in which I 
grew up some fifty years ago, let alone earlier eras of our history. 
This may explain the motivation for the conference, but it doesn't ex-
plain why I was invited to participate in it. That, I presume, is due to the 
fact that some sixteen years ago I published an essay titled The Confronta-
tion of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 
which was republished in a book of essays of mine entitled Wrestling with 
Diversity. I It is perhaps worth noting that the most common topic treated in 
the nine essays that comprised this book was the religious diversity that has 
long characterized the United States. This religious diversity presents many 
* W. St. John Garwood and W. st. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, University 
of Texas Law School. An earlier version of this essay was prepared for delivery at the symposium 
at the University of St. Thomas School of Law, November 10, 2006. I am extremely grateful for 
the invitation to participate in that symposium and for the kindnesses shown me on that occasion. I 
am also grateful to Jack M. Balkin and Walter F. Murphy for their responses to that earlier 
version. 
L Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics 
Becoming Justices, reprinted in SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 192 (2003). 
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obvious challenges that are slighted in the tendency to focus only on racial 
or ethnic diversity. Consider the fact that most adherents of "diversity" in 
university admissions or public office, who are usually political liberals, 
often speak of the importance of hearing the distinctive "voice" alle~edly 
linked to those with certain racial, ethnic, or gender experiences? Yet most 
of those liberals at one and the same time are prone to suggest that there is 
something suspicious about similar concerns, and programs, designed to as-
sure the presence of explicitly religious sensibilities in discussions, whether 
in the classroom or elsewhere.3 The skepticism about, if not outright hostil-
ity to, the overt expression of religious points of view is maximized when 
discussing public officials, including, of course-and especially-the pub-
lic office of judge.4 
Joseph Raz coined the term "epistemic abstinence"s to refer to the de-
mand by some important strands of liberal political theory that religious 
office-holders self-consciously abstain from making reference to arguments 
based on religious belief in favor of presenting arguments that can be de-
fended on the basis of secular reason alone. As I argued many years ago in 
an essay examining the use of religious language in the "public square," this 
demand seems to treat religiously-inclined citizens as second-class. These 
religiously-inclined citizens, and only these citizens, are required to "trans-
late" their arguments from one realm (the religious) into the language of 
another.6 I argued that the principle of "equal concern and respect" might 
require opening the public square to religious arguments, though I was con-
siderably more uncertain about their propriety when presented by public 
officials. 
There may, however, be an important consequence of allowing more 
religious discourse in the public square. To the extent that individuals pre-
sent themselves to others as significantly constituted by their religious iden-
tity, it seems fair to me that they subject themselves to being questioned 
about the implications of those beliefs for the performance of their public 
roles. It will not do, for example. to say that "I always ask 'What would 
Jesus do?''' and then claim an entitlement, based either on the No Test Oath 
Clause of Article VI or on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment, to refrain from addressing questions like, "How is it that you discern 
what Jesus would do?" or "Is it conceptually possible that the law, correctly 
interpreted, would require acting in ways quite opposite of what Jesus 
would do? If so, which would take priority?" To the extent that a secular 
2. See id. at 11. 
3. See id. at 47-51,278-80. 
4. See id. at 233. 
5. See Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, 19 PHIL. & PuB. 
AFF. 3 (1990). 
6. See Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
2061,2073 (1992) (review of MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND 
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991». 
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person can be examined on the implication of her beliefs for the perform-
ance of a public role-including membership on a court-the same should 
be true for someone whose beliefs are presented as religiously based. This, I 
believe, is required by our commitment to equality. I am sympathetic to 
claims that religious persons are denied equal concern and respect when 
they are told they ought not speak in their own voice in the public square. 
By the same token, I am unsympathetic to the claim that they should be 
exempt from the same degree of scrutiny of such beliefs that is received by 
secularists. 
II. SOME EARLIER EXPERIENCES OF CATHOLICS IN THE PuBLIC SQUARE 
Given the lamentable anti-Catholicism that has pervaded much of the 
American past, it is perhaps not surprising that Catholic nominees for the 
Supreme Court sometimes face direct questions from senators about the im-
plications of their religious membership for the performance of their duties 
if confIrmed to join the High Court. Thus in my initial article, I examined 
the confIrmation hearings of Catholic nominees to the Supreme Court, in-
cluding William J. Brennan, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy, and 
pointed out that a common theme of those hearings was the felt need for 
reassurance, to put it bluntly, that their primary loyalties were to the Consti-
tution (and the United States) rather than to the Vatican and the Roman 
Catholic Church. Such concerns were expressed both openly and more sub-
tly, but there can be little doubt that they reflected a fear, seen throughout 
much of our history, about potential for dual loyalty among what many 
antagonistic individuals used to label "Papists." 
Exemplary in this regard is the question directed at then-New Jersey 
Justice William Brennan by Wyoming Senator Joseph O'Mahoney, himself 
a Catholic, who had been pressed by the members of the National Liberal 
League to ask "would you be able to follow the requirements of your oath 
[of constitutional fIdelity] or would you be bound by your religious obliga-
tions?"7 Lest one believe that the National Liberal League was a latter-day 
secularist organization, one should be aware that it described the United 
States as "a predominantly Protestant country" that, presumably, should be 
extremely wary of having Catholics on its highest court. Recall that only 
four years later, on September 12, 1960, John F. Kennedy was forced to go 
before the Greater Houston Ministerial Association, where he delivered the 
following expression of his religious-political credo: 
I believe in an America where the separation of church and state 
is absolute-where no Catholic prelate would tell the President 
(should he be Catholic) how to act, and no Protestant minister 
would tell his parishoners [sic] for whom to vote. . . . 
7. LEVINSON, supra note I, at 2lO. 
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I believe in an America that is officially neither Catholic, Protes-
tant nor Jewish-where no public official either requests or ac-
cepts instructions on public policy from the Pope, the National 
Council of Churches or any other ecclesiastical source-where no 
religious body seeks to impose its will directly or indirectly upon 
the general populace or the public acts of its officials. . .. 8 
Justice Brennan presumably approved of Kennedy's reassuring mes-
sage. After all, he offered the Senate similar assurance that he would of 
course give priority to the Constitution. According to Brennan, "there isn't 
any obligation of our faith superior to" the oath to support the Constitution.9 
I presume Brennan believed the Constitution is what I have elsewhere 
called a "comic" document, providing sufficiently "happy endings" to legal 
dilemmas so that, for example, fidelity to the Constitution never required 
the judge to acquiesce in something truly evil (as opposed to merely 
"suboptimal"). Otherwise, as has been suggested by Thomas Shaffer (one 
of our most interesting and insightful analysts of the implications of taking 
one's religious commitments seriously), it would be "idolatry" to give the 
secular Constitution priority over Divine authority. to This is obviously 
harsh language, but fair-at least if one takes seriously the possibility that 
there can be tensions between Divine commands and those of the State. 
It is obvious that some current members of the Court believe in the 
possibility of such tensions. In this context, one might recall a notable 
speech Justice Scalia gave in 2002 at the Chicago Divinity School discuss-
ing the death penalty.ll Not only did he say he would feel compelled to 
resign if he believed the death penalty to be immoral, presumably because 
he sees nothing in the positive law of the United States Constitution that 
prohibits capital punishment, but he also added that any discussion as to the 
morality or immorality of capital punishment for him necessarily involved 
reference "to Christian tradition and the Church's Magisterium."12 Justice 
Scalia said, 
I am . . . happy to leam from the canonical experts I have con-
sulted that the position set forth in Evangelicum Vitae [which ex-
presses doubts about the morality of capital punishment] and in 
the latest versions of the Catholic catechism does not purport to 
be binding teaching-that is, it need not be accepted by practicing 
8. Senator John F. Kennedy, Address to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association (Sept. 
12, 1960), available at http://www.jfklibrary.orgIHistorical+ResourcesiArchivesIReference+Deskl 
Speeches/JFKJJFK+Pre-PresiAddress+of+Senator+John+F.+Kennedy+to+the+Greater+Houston+ 
Ministerial+Association.htm. 
9. LEVINSON, supra note 1. at 211. 
10. See id. at 215 n.64. 
11. See Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17. 
12. LEVINSON, supra note I. at 252 (quoting Antonin Scalia). 
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Catholics, thought [sic] they must give it thoughtful and respect-
ful consideration . . . and I disagree. 13 
Justice Thomas also made a stirring argument while explaining one 
source of his zealous opposition to the use of racial categories in public 
policy: 
You cannot embrace racism to deal with racism. It's not Chris-
tian. . . . Jesus said go and sin no more. That is what I have to 
do .... If I type one word at my word processor in one opinion 
(justifying the legality of such "racism"] I break God's law .... If 
I write racism into law, then I am in God's eye no better than 
[slaveowners] are. 14 
Recall that Kennedy could easily tell his listeners he believed in a very 
sharp separation of church and state. Moreover, even if there is no reason to 
doubt Kennedy's formal adherence to the Catholic Church, none of his ma-
jor biographers display a man (unlike, for example, his mother Rose) for 
whom religious beliefs were particularly important. 15 But there have been 
significant changes in American political culture in the past forty years, and 
one of them involves the degree to which some public figures-including 
Justice Scalia-wear aspects of their religious identities and beliefs on their 
sleeves. Moreover, in recent years, the Catholic Church and other religious 
institutions have appeared more willing to make public "demands" of their 
members who inhabit public office.16 Any consideration of the confmna-
tion hearings I discuss must take these new realities into account. 
For me, the issues are most sharply delineated in a 1996 contribution 
by then-Texas Supreme Court Justice Raul Gonzalez to a symposium in the 
Texas Tech Law Review on Faith and the Law. "Whether we want to admit 
it or not," he wrote, "our religious convictions impact every relationship 
and every aspect of our lives.'>l7 He observed that "[t]here are some who 
13. [d. at 253. 
14. [d. at 250. 
15. Kennedy's most recent biographer, Robert Dal1ek, describes Kennedy as developing by 
the time he was at Harvard "an intellectual's skepticism about the limits of human understanding 
and beliefs." ROBERT DALLEK, AN UNFINISHED LIFE: JOHN F. KENNEDY 1917-1963 59 (2003). 
Dallek notes that in 1939 Kennedy asked a priest why "we should believe Christ any more than 
Mohammed," which led the priest to urge Joseph Kennedy to get Jack some immediate religious 
instruction "or else he would tum into an atheist." [d. Moreover, Dallek describes an encounter of 
Jack with a friend at Harvard who asked him why he was attending church on a Catholic holy day. 
According to the friend, Jack "got this odd, hard look on his face," replying, "This is one of the 
things I do for my father. The rest I do for myself." [d. There is no evidence that he ever embraced 
a stronger notion of his relationship to the Catholic Church. It is scarcely surprising. then. that 
Kennedy had little trouble endorsing what was then the conventional view on the separation of 
public duty from religious obligations. 
16. See infra notes 47-58. 
17. Raul A. Gonzalez, Climbing the Ladder of Success-My Spiritual Journey, 27 TEX. 
TECH. L. REv. 1139, 1139 (1996) (emphasis added). 
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believe that religious beliefs should be private and have no bearing on their 
work."18 To contrast such a view, he noted that, 
[O]thers, like myself ... believe that we are called to live our 
faith full time, not just on weekends, and that all our thoughts, 
words, and deeds should be impacted by our religious convic-
tions. To me, it is an inescapable fact that our perspective on any 
issue is influenced by where we place ourselves on the religious 
spectrum. To deny this fact is to be dishonest. 19 
Justice Gonzalez went on briefly to describe nine cases in which "my rela-
tionship with God impacted the way I considered and wrote about the issues 
presented."20 Once again, he emphasized that "[h]ow we experience God 
and our level of religious commitment (or lack of commitment) impacts our 
work."21 
Justice Gonzalez, who outlines his own falling away from, and then 
return to, his strongly Catholic identity, might well exemplify what some 
observers have referred to the present era as the "Third Great Awakening" 
in our culture, the second having occurred in the 1 820s and '30S.22 Most of 
us are presumably aware that the current President has described Jesus as 
his favorite philosopher;23 fewer, I suspect, are aware that his predecessor, 
President Clinton, had said that, 
Sometimes I think the environment in which we operate is en-
tirely too secular .... [T]hose of us who have faith should frankly 
admit that we are animated by that faith, that we try to live by it-
and that it does affect what we feel, what we think, and what we 
do.24 
It is, I think, also appropriate to note that one reason I was impelled to 
write the article, beyond my general interest in the intersections of religious 
and secular political identities,25 was the stimulation provided by a power-
ful statement by the distinguished Columbia historian Istvan Deak, who has 
written much on the response to the Holocaust in Middle and Eastern Eu-
rope: "Roman Catholicism represents a beautiful anachronism in our age of 
crazed nationalism; virtually every devout Catholic preserves in his heart 
some remnant of his denomination's transnational loyalty and the duty of 
18. Id. at 1147. 
19. Id. (emphasis added). 
20. Id. at 1157. 
21. Id. 
22. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. CONFORTI, JONATHAN EDWARDS, RELIGIOUS TRADmON, & AMERI-
CAN CULTURE (1995). 
23. Upon being asked in a presidential debate, "What pOlitical philosopher or thinker do you 
identify with and why?" Then-Governor Bush replied, "Christ, because he changed my heart." 
William F. Buckley, Jr., Bush the Evangelist?, NAT'L REv., June 5,2006, at 59. 
24. LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 241-42 (quoting President Clinton) (emphasiS added). 
25. See Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of 
Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1577 (1993), reprinted in WRESTLING WITH DIVER-
SITY, supra note 1, at 124. 
286 UNNERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:2 
Catholics to defy immorallaws."26 If anything, "crazed nationalism" seems 
to describe our own world-and, I regret to say, sometimes our own coun-
try-even more in 2007 than in 1989, when Professor Deak wrote. At that 
moment, after all, one was surrounded by images not only of a stunning 
victory of the West at the end of the Cold War, but also of what seemed like 
inevitable movement toward liberal democracy and what then-President 
George H.W. Bush, on September 11, 1990, was calling a "new world or-
der" that included significant recognition of interdependence and the impor-
tance of strengthening international institutions.27 Francis Fukuyama had 
just published his famous essay in The National Interest entitled The End of 
History,28 which seems, in 2007, to be an extremely bad joke. More than 
ever, one might believe, it is important to inculcate in citizens a belief that 
there are in fact "transnational" loyalties and norms that should be used at 
least to judge, and sometimes to compel defiance, of immoral positive law. 
In any event, I am indeed grateful for the opportunity given me by the 
organizers of the conference-and as the Supreme Court has become a ma-
jority-Catholic institution-to "update" some of the arguments offered in 
my earlier article, written at a time when there were only three Catholic 
Justices (Brennan, Scalia, and Kennedy). There are both new data and ad-
ded opportunities for reflection on the underlying issues of the relationship, 
if any, between ostensibly "private" religious faith and one's performance 
of "public" roles. 
ITI. RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES AND THE CURRENT COURT 
Perhaps it is worth noting that among the five Catholic Justices on the 
current Court is Clarence Thomas, who has a relatively complex religious 
history. 
At the time Justice Clarence Thomas was confirmed in 1991, he 
said that despite having been raised Catholic and having spent 
several years in a seminary, he was not a practicing Catholic. In 
1996 he told fellow alumni at Holy Cross College in Worcester, 
Mass., that he had recently returned to the church ... .29 
26. Istvan Deak:, The Incomprehensible Holocaust, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Sept. 28. 1989, at 
66. 
27. See President George H.W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the 
Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit (Sept. 11, 1990), available at http://bushli-
brary.tamu.edu/research/papers/l990/90091101.htrnl ('''!be crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as 
it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these 
troubled times, our fifth objective-a new world order-can emerge."). 
28. Later expanded into FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 
(1992). 
29. Patricia Zapor, Catholics, Though Few in Number, Have Lengthy History on High Court. 
July 21. 2005, http://www.catholicnews.cOluidata/storiesicns/0504224.htm. 
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At the very least, this means that whatever other sturm und drang was at-
tached to his confirmation hearings, there was presumably no reason to 
delve into his Catholic identity as of 1991. 
No such ambiguity about religious identity was present with regard to 
John Roberts and Samuel Alito, nor, for that matter, of the less visible, but 
far more contentious, nomination of William Pryor to join the 11 th Circuit 
Court of Appeals after service as Alabama's Attorney General. In all three 
nominations, reference was made to the fact of their respective Catholic 
identities. Although religion seemed to play almost no role in the debate 
about Roberts and Alito, Pryor appeared to be another matter. The consider-
ation by the Senate of these three recent appointments to the federal bench 
may shed some light on whether we in the United States have figured out an 
acceptable way to address the questions raised by serious commitment to 
one's religious heritage. 
Attorney General Pryor, perhaps because he came to the bench from a 
background as an elected politician in Alabama rather than the far more 
national elite route that Roberts and Alito followed, had the richest paper 
trail, including a graduation speech to a Catholic high school in 1997. After 
acknowledging that the "American experiment is not a theocracy and does 
not establish an official religion," he went on to declare that "the Declara-
tion of Independence and the Constitution of the United States are rooted in 
a Christian perspective of the nature of government and the nature of 
man."30 I myself would tend to doubt this statement, especially with regard 
to the Constitution,31 but the issue is presumably open to debate. In any 
case, this states only an empirical claim. Mr. Pryor, however, went on to 
assert a strong normative claim as well: "The challenge of the next millen-
nium is to preserve the American experiment by restoring its Christian per-
spective."32 Nothing could be rhetorically further from the kind of 
separationism evoked by John F. Kennedy. 
Justice Gonzalez, of course, was never nominated for membership on 
the federal bench and therefore never faced the prospect of explaining his 
article to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Nor, equally obviously, can the 
Committee call back Justices Scalia and Thomas to explain their post-con-
firmation (and extra-judicial) comments. Attorney General Pryor was not so 
lucky. He was nominated for the 11 th Circuit Court of Appeals, and the 
nature of his Catholic religious commitments did indeed become a topic of 
the subsequent hearing. Interestingly enough, though, it was one of Pryor's 
30. Alabama Attorney General William Pryor, Remarks at the McGill-Toolen High School 
Graduation (1997) (quoted in Confirmation Hearing on the Nominations of William Pryor, Jr. to 
be U.S. Circuit Judge for the 11th Circuit: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, lO8th 
Congo 76 (2003)). 
31. See, e.g., ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: A 
MORAL DEFENSE OF THE SECULAR STATE (rev. ed. 200S). 
32. Pryor, supra note 30 (emphasis added). 
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strongest supporters, Utah Senator Orrin Hatch, who, after describing Pryor 
as "a devout pro-life Catholic," went on to say that, whatever his "personal 
faith," he had "never, to my knowledge, allowed [it] to interfere with what 
the law is."33 For me, this suggests one of two things: a) as suggested ear-
lier, it is a happy truth that there is simply no conflict between what is 
required by American law and the teachings of the Catholic Church; or b) at 
the end of the day, one's religious faith, however "deep" and "committed" 
it may be, is to be subordinated to the demands of the secular law. Caesar 
reigns triumphant over any potentially conflicting religious commands. Per-
haps, after all is said and done, the "Christian perspective" leaves Christians 
free to collaborate with what they view as evil. 
There may, of course, be other more nuanced possibilities. One might, 
after all, cite Romans 13 for the proposition that civil authorities, even if not 
Catholic themselves, are best viewed as God's magistrates.34 Perhaps there 
remain Catholics who share the view articulated by Pope Gelasius I, who in 
the year 494 reassured the Roman Emperor Anastasius that his "imperial 
office was conferred upon him by divine disposition,"35 but, frankly, I 
would be surprised. More likely, perhaps, is an argument that deference to 
civil authorities is conducive to maintaining civil peace and avoiding "scan-
dal," which is no small virtue of the Catholic doctrine.36 After all, an Ortho-
dox Jew, who might also be viewed by some as having religious 
commitments that might run counter to secular law, could cite the long-
established doctrine Dina De-Malchuta Dina ("the law of the land is law," 
including law made by non-Jewish officials).37 I presume that similarly 
pragmatic desire to avoid "scandal" and preserve public order would allow 
a committed Catholic judge to enforce what he or she deemed to be im-
moral-perhaps even "evil" -laws at least under some circumstances. One 
might, of course, be interested in the views of serious Catholics on such 
issues, especially when they are nominated for judicial office. One of the 
most gripping discussions at the symposium presented by the University of 
St. Thomas School of Law's Law Journal involved an extremely high-level 
consideration of the doctrine of "cooperation" within Catholic theology.38 
This invokes the circumstances under which a committed Catholic can par-
33. [d. 
34. Romans 13:1-2 (ENGLISH STANDARD VERSION) ("Let every person be subject to the gov-
erning authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been 
instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and 
those who resist will incur judgment."). 
35. LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 207 n.37. 
36. I continue to be grateful to Robert George for educating me in the nuances of natural law 
jurisprudence. See id. at 226 n.85. 
37. Rabbi Herschel Schachter, "Dina De'malchusa Dina": Secular Law as a Religious Obli-
gation, in HALACHA AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 85 (Alfred S. Cohen ed., 1983). 
38. Edward A. Hartnett, Remarks at the University of St. Thomas School of Law Sympo-
sium: Catholicism and the Court (Nov. 10, 2006). 
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ticipate at all in a legal process involving presumptively immoral outcomes, 
such as abortion or, for some, capital punishment. 
Far from embarking on such a conversation, Vermont Democrat (and 
Catholic) Patrick Leahy was upset with the fact that Senator Hatch had 
referred to Pryor's Catholic commitments at all. He argued that the Consti-
tution in effect requires "religion-blindness" on the part of senators decid-
ing whether to conftrm a nominee, whether or not it requires similar 
"blindness" to race, gender, or any other personal attribute in a similar situ-
ation. For Leahy, the rationale for treating religion as special-Le., compel-
ling blindness to its reality-is based directly on the Constitution's "no 
religious test" clause of Article VI. 39 ''The beauty of our First Amendment 
and the beauty of our prohibition against religious tests is it means just that, 
and that is why we have had people of faith, of all faiths who have given so 
much to the government of this country .... "40 He made this argument, 
incidentally, while justifying his own opposition to Pryor, claiming that it 
was on the basis of what Leahy regarded as Pryor's own cramped legal 
views and not at all because of suspicions about his religious commitments. 
Republican Senator Arlen Specter agreed with Leahy about the basic 
issue of what might be termed religious interrogation: "I would hope," said 
Specter, "that this committee would not inquire into anybody's religion. 
There are enough questions to inquiry into and enough substantive matters 
that that ought to be out of bounds."41 Specter was clearly upset that Pryor 
had described Planned Parenthood v. Casey as "the worst abomination of 
constitutional law in our history," and he was not assuaged when Pryor 
described the case as not only "unsupported by the text and structure of the 
Constitution," but also as having "led to a morally wrong result. It has led 
to the slaughter of millions of innocent, unborn children. That's my per-
sonal belief."42 
For whatever reason, including, perhaps, the discomfort expressed by 
Senators Leahy and Specter at the injection of Attorney General Pryor's 
religious views, the Catholicism of then-Judges Roberts and Alito seemed 
to play an absolutely minimal role in the hearings on their respective nomi-
nations for the Supreme Court. It was not wholly absent, but it was certainly 
muted. California Senator Diane Feinstein did ask Judge Roberts a perfectly 
reasonable question about his views on the separation of church and state, 
to which he replied, "I do know this: that my faith and my religious beliefs 
do not play a role in judging. When it comes to judging, I look to the law 
books and always have. I don't look to the bible [sic] or any other religious 
39. "[NJo religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public 
Trust under the United States." U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2. 
40. U.S. Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) Holds Hearing on Judicial Nominations: Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, 109th Congo 9 (2005). 
41. [d. 
42. [d. 
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source."43 She did not follow up with a question, for example, on his reac-
tions to Justice Scalia's description of his felt need to study with care the 
approach of the Catholic Church to the issue of capital punishment. Scalia 
did not study this, recall, to ascertain the meaning of American law, but, 
rather, to determine whether he could, in good conscience, sit in such cases 
or, on the contrary, might feel under a duty to recuse himself or even to 
resign. I might note that recusal did figure in Judge Alito's hearing, but only 
with regard to his sitting in a case involving a mutual fund in which he 
owned some shares. Nothing was said about "moral" recusal. One of the 
witnesses against Judge Roberts, Dr. Susan Thistlethwaite, president and 
professor of theology at the Chicago Theological Seminary, indicated that 
she had reservations about whether Judge Roberts "believes in the dream 
that is the United States of America," but she made no allusion to his relig-
ious commitments in her brief statement to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.44 
During the Alito hearings, at least one witness (Kate Michelman of the 
National Abortion Rights Action League) and two Democratic senators 
(Vermont's Patrick Leahy and Delaware's Joseph Biden) did allude to their 
own membership in the Catholic Church. Biden, for example, described 
himself as an "Irish Catholic kid from Claymont."45 But this was presuma-
bly to underscore the point that their opposition to Alito's nomination in no 
way stemmed from "anti-Catholic" bias. (I do not know, however, if any-
one within the Catholic community accuses them of being "self-hating 
Catholics," an accusation sometimes leveled at Jews who self-consciously 
advert to their religious identity when criticizing Israel.) 
Although Senator Specter literally led off his questioning, as Commit-
tee Chair, by asking about Alito's views on the "right to privacy" and, of 
course, Roe v. Wade, there was no mention at all of the fact that he is 
Catholic or that Catholicism might be relevant in determining his support, 
or lack of same, for the protection of women's reproductive rights. One 
could read the entire transcript of Justice Alito's appearance before the 
committee without discovering, save through the otherwise inexplicable al-
lusions by Catholic Senators Biden and Leahy, to Alito's own Catholicism. 
From one perspective, this represents a triumphant moment in Ameri-
can political development. One need not be Catholic to recognize that 
throughout American history antagonism against Roman Catholics has been 
pervasive. One might have even expected this antagonism to become more 
43. U.S. Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) Holds Hearing on Roberts Nomination: Senate Judi-
ciary Committee., I09th Congo 88 (2005). 
44. Confirmation Hearing for Judge John G. Roberts to be Chief Justice of the United States: 
Panel VI of the Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 109th Congo 7 (2005). 
45. Transcript: U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Judge AUto's Nomination to the 
Supreme Court (Jan. 11,2006), available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlcontentlarti-
cle/2OO6JOIl11lAR20060IIlOI335.htmI. 
2006] RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES 291 
pronounced as the center of American Protestantism has shifted from what 
used to be called "mainstream" churches to more self-consciously Evangeli-
cal ones linked with religious traditions that in living memory viewed the 
Church as the Whore of Babylon-thus the felt need for Kennedy to pay his 
peculiar pilgrimage to Houston. This has most certainly not been the case 
more recently. As James Davison Hunter suggested some fifteen years ago, 
the most important fault lines in American culture are no longer those 
among Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, but, rather, between those who 
identify themselves strongly as "religious" and those who are, when all is 
said and done, far more secular.46 
IV. Two CHEERS (AT MOST) FOR RETICENCE 
Still, I want to suggest that one should offer, at most, two cheers-and 
definitely not three-for the reticence about religion articulated by Leahy 
and Specter and manifested in the hearings on Roberts and Alito. One 
might, I suppose, believe that, as with John Kennedy, Roberts and Alito are 
not "serious" about their Catholicism, though there is no reason at all to 
believe that this is the case. What can be said about both of these men, 
though, is that they were, by and large, extremely cautious in their self-
presentations over the years as they moved steadily forward toward the 
higher public offices to which they presumably aspired. Neither was re-
motely so revealing in their pre-nomination careers as Justice Gonzalez or 
Attorney General Pryor, and one would be more than a bit surprised if ei-
ther turns out to be so plainspoken, with regard to their religious commit-
ments, as Justices Scalia and Thomas. So one question is obviously whether 
the absence of any serious examination of the nature of their religious com-
mitments is person-specific. This then encourages us to ask whether a dif-
ferent result would indeed be legitimate with regard to Gonzales and 
Pryor-or, for that matter, Justices Scalia or Thomas had either been nomi-
nated to succeed William Rehnquist as Chief Justice. 
But one should not believe this is a question relating only to the indi-
vidual nominees. One is surely entitled to take into account the extent to 
which the institutional Catholic Church has, in the almost two decades since 
I began my inquiries into this subject, attempted to play an ever-greater role 
with regard to influencing American politics. This influence is not limited 
to only what might be termed "wholesale" intervention concerning such 
issues as abortion, capital punishment, the privation visited upon the poor, 
and the like. It also includes a more "retail" emphasis on particular Ameri-
can political figures, especially if they are Catholic themselves, who are 
pressured by the institutional church to conform to its teachings. John 
Kerry, for example, was barred from receiving communion by S1. Louis 
46. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTIJRE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991). 
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Archbishop Raymond Burke.47 Presumably, this action had been en-
couraged by what a writer in The National Review described as a January 
2003 "doctrinal note" issued by the Vatican "reiterating the obligation of 
Catholic politicians to oppose abortion. Days later," Ramesh Ponnuru 
noted, "the [B]ishop of Sacramento ... told California governor Gray Davis 
not to receive communion.,,48 Lest one believe that this is an entirely new 
development or that its politics are inevitably conservative, he also noted 
that "in 1962, Archbishop Rummel of New Orleans excommunicated segre-
gationist .politicians who had tried to block the integration of church 
schools."49 I would be surprised indeed if non-Catholic political liberals did 
not applaud this dramatic intervention into the politics of the deep South. 
It is surely interesting that in April 2004 then-Cardinal Joseph Ratz-
inger sent a letter to Washington, D.C. Cardinal Theodore McCarrick, in 
which the person who is now Pope Benedict XVI wrote: 
Regarding the grave sin of abortion or euthanasia, when a per-
son's formal cooperation becomes manifest (understood, in the 
case of a Catholic politician, as his consistently campaigning and 
voting for permissive abortion and euthanasia laws), his Pastor 
should meet with him, instructing him about the Church's teach-
ing, informing him that he is not to present himself for Holy 
Communion until he brings to an end the objective situation of 
sin, and warning him that he will otherwise be denied the Eucha-
rist. When "these precautionary measures have not had their ef-
fect or in which they were not possible," and the person in 
question, with obstinate persistence, still presents himself to re-
ceive the Holy Eucharist, "the minister of Holy Communion must 
refuse to distribute it."so 
As if things were not sufficiently complicated, note also that on June 22, 
2006, at the Mass celebrating the installation of Donald Wuerl as the new 
Archbishop of Washington, D.C., "Archbishop Pietro Sambi, the represen-
tative of Pope Benedict XVI, was seen giving Holy Communion to pro-
abortion Senator and former Presidential candidate John Kerry."sl I leave it 
to others to decode the meaning of this event. 
It may well confirm Hunter's insight about the cultural realignments 
now going on in American society that Evangelical Protestants appear to be 
more inclined to support the denial of communion to Kerry and other pro-
47. David Paul Kuhn, Kerry's Communion Controversy, CBS NEWS, Apr. 6, 2004, http:// 
www.cbsnews.comlstories/2004/04/06/politics/main61 0547 .shtml. 
48. Ramesh Ponnuru, Rites and Wrongs: The Politics of Communion, NAT'L REv., May 31, 
2004, http://www.nationalreview.comlflashback/ponnuru20041 0 191 027 .asp. 
49. [d. 
50. John-Henry Westen, Highest Authorities in Vatican Back Denial of Communion to Pro· 
Abortion Politicians, LIFESITE, July 5, 2004, http://www.lifesite.netlldnl2004/juU0407050I.html. 
51. John-Henry Westen, Papal Nuncio Gives Communion to John Kerry-Likely Uninten· 
tional, LIFESITE, June 26, 2006, http://www.lifesite.netlldnl2006/junl06062605.html. 
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choice candidates than are Roman Catholics themselves. Thus an August 
2004 poll found that 72% of Catholic respondents disapproved of refusing 
communion to politicians "whose views on abortion, stem-cell research and 
euthanasia run contrary to church teachings," whereas only 47% of Protes-
tant Evangelicals appear to have disapproved of such actions.52 
V. CONCLUSION 
In any event, it seems to me that we need to develop a far more sophis-
ticated understanding of when it is indeed proper to interrogate individuals 
who either proclaim commitment to pervasive-i.e., distinctly non-"pietis-
tic"-religious values, and/or are members of institutional churches (and 
this goes well beyond the Catholic Church) that make strong efforts to en-
courage conformity on the part of their membership to the basic tenets of 
the denomination. I want to emphasize, incidentally, that I see nothing nec-
essarily wrong with such efforts. There is no overriding reason why the 
Catholic Church, or any other institution, must conform its views to those 
of persons outside the relevant faith communities. I have thus written sharp 
criticism of Princeton University historian Sean Wilentz,53 who I believe 
rather thoughtlessly denounced Justice Scalia's speech, mentioned earlier, 
concerning his views on capital punishment. As I noted, Justice Scalia quite 
explicitly did not say that "Catholic justices" were obligated to interpret the 
Constitution to be in line with the Church's teachings. What he did say is 
that, were he faced with an unbridgeable conflict between what he saw as 
the commands of the Constitution and those of his Church, he would feel 
compelled either to recuse himself or to resign from the bench.54 
My point, therefore, is not to take a particular position on the relation-
ship between membership in a religious community that makes its own de-
mands for obedience and participation in public life as a role-bound public 
official. Rather, I think: this is a truly important issue that demands far more 
discussion than it has received. The question is whether any of that discus-
sion, assuming it is proper in the fIrst place, may take place during Senate 
hearings on judicial nominations. We have already seen that Senator Leahy 
invoked the No Test Oath Clause of Article VI, and I have discovered that 
many people believe that it serves to answer the questions I have raised 
above in the negative. That is, the Clause does render inappropriate any 
questions that touch on a nominee's religious views-period. 
I continue to be unconvinced, especially, and perhaps exclusively, 
when it is the nominees themselves who have in effect encouraged such 
52. Julia Duin, Denial of Communion Disapproved, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, http:// 
www.washtirnes.comlnationaV20040824-115323-3008r.htrn. 
53. Sean Wilentz, From Justice Scalia, a Chilling Vision of Religion's Authority in America, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2002, at A19, available at http://select.nytirnes.comlsearchlrestrictedlartic1e? 
res=FOOD16F73B55OC7B8CDDAE0894DA404482. 
54. See LEVINSON, supra note 1, at 253. 
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questions by making such comments as those quoted earlier in this article. It 
is one thing to raise questions about religion with nominees who have not 
acted to make their religious commitments germane to understanding their 
performance of their public roles. It is another to ask someone who has 
made public profession of the importance of his or her own religion what 
precisely was the meaning of those professions. Perhaps one might analo-
gize this to the proper scope of a cross-examination. There are, of course, 
many subjects that are protected against further inquiry if they were not 
raised on direct examination; but if they have come up on direct examina-
tion, then there is nothing at all problematic about exploring them further on 
cross-examination. So it is, I would suggest, with religious views that the 
nominee has herself declared to be important in defining her identity and 
conception of public service. 
Jack Balkin has pointed out that Article VI is concerned generally with 
the supremacy of the Constitution. 55 Immediately preceding the No Test 
Oath Clause, after all, is a requirement that every public official take an 
oath "to support this Constitution." Is it required that we read the No Test 
Oath Clause to protect public officials who might be averse to "support[ing] 
this Constitution" in circumstances, however remote, where they might 
come into conflict with one's religious obligations from even discussing 
such possibilities before being confirmed for a lifetime position on the 
bench? One can readily understand the No Test Oath Clause as a means of 
protecting nominees from inquiry into theological questions that most of us 
would regard as completely irrelevant, because non-germane, to questions 
of constitutional fidelity. Wars may have been triggered over the doctrine of 
transubstantiation, and there may be grave differences of opinion about the 
Immaculate Conception, but it is difficult indeed to discern the relevance of 
either to standard-form constitutional interpretation. And, ultimately, one 
may rejoice in a reading of Article VI that renders it unconstitutional for 
Congress to require that one believe in God at all in order to hold public 
office. But it is a decidedly different matter to read the Clause to prevent 
furthering a conversation that in substantial measure was initiated by nomi-
nees themselves. 
It would be altogether understandable if one simply rejected the possi-
bility of sophisticated questioning and analysis from bloviating senators os-
tensibly engaging in the performance of their constitutional duty to "advise 
and consent" to presidential nominations to the judiciary. Perhaps this disre-
spect for the senators leads one to be overly tolerant of patently disingenu-
ous responses by nominees when asked, perhaps ineptly, to reflect on the 
tangled complex jurisdictional overlaps between the domains of God and 
Caesar. And perhaps it justifies a "prophylactic" reading of Article VI that 
55. Conversation with Jack Balkin, Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First 
Amendment, Yale Law School (2006). 
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simply rules out-of-bounds any questions at all touching on religious be-
liefs, even if the questions are sparked by the nominees' own statements 
prior to nomination. But I am increasingly convinced that such disrespect 
and concomitant tolerance for evasion is simply another sign that we may 
be unable to engage in genuinely serious discussion of what, for over two 
millennia, have been among the most important issues of political theory, 
whether secular or religious. 
I am extremely grateful for the opportunity to raise such questions in 
what I regard as one of the most interesting law schools in America. I 
would be even happier, though, if it were possible to discuss these issues in 
a serious way outside of the walls of the legal academy. 
